Abstract: This paper incorporates banks as well as frictions in the market for bank capital into a standard New Keynesian model and considers the positive and normative implications of various …nancial shocks. It shows that the frictions matter signi…cantly for the e¤ects of the shocks and the properties of optimal monetary and …scal policy. For instance, for shocks that increase banks' demand for liquidity, optimal monetary policy accepts an output contraction while it would not in the absence of the frictions (or under suitably conducted …scal policy). We …nd that optimal monetary policy can be approximated by a simple interest-rate rule targeting in ‡ation; and it also allows large adjustments in the money supply, a property reminiscent of Poole's analysis.
Introduction
The recent financial crisis has drawn attention to a number of important policy questions. For instance, how should fiscal and monetary policy react to an increase in the default rate on bank loans? How are liquidity problems affecting the funding side of banks (in interbank and securities markets) transmitted to the lending side, and what is the appropriate policy response? How does a fiscal transfer (a capital infusion like the US bank bailout) affect the banks' willingness to lend as well as the central banks' menu of optimal actions?
The benchmark New Keynesian (NK) model [e.g., Woodford (2003) ], the workhorse model for monetary-policy analysis, abstracts from money and banking and thus cannot be used to study such questions. The objective of this paper is to develop a simple, unified framework that is capable of addressing the questions raised above. To this end, we add a banking sector as well as an explicit friction in the market for bank capital to a basic NK model and consider the positive and normative implications of three shocks: a shock that increases the default rate on bank loans, a shock that increases the demand for excess reserves, and a shock that hampers the ability of banks to securitize loans. While these shocks have allegedly played a prominent role in the recent financial crisis (and have motivated papers such as Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009) and Hobijn and Ravenna (2009)) we do not study their implications during singular events such as a crisis but rather under "standard" business cycle conditions. 2 We show how the equity market friction matters for the transmission of these shocks-and, therefore, for optimal policy responses-and how its implications may differ significantly from those obtained in standard financial macro-models that lack this feature. Consequently, to the extent that such frictions play a role in macroeconomic fluctuations, our analysis may provide useful insights about the conduct of optimal policy that go beyond those available in the literature.
Why is such a friction worth considering? Models with frictionless equity markets for bank capital may have a number of strong implications that derive from the ability of banks to recapitalize themselves easily by lowering dividend payments or, if need be, paying negative dividends. In such models, the lending and borrowing sides of banks become decoupled. The spread between the lending rate and the risk-free (CCAPM) rate depends on default risk but not on the liquidity shock affecting the demand for excess reserves. Moreover, a bank in such a world would never undertake costly securitization because it can always get funds at the CCAPM rate from its owners and save them the costs of securitization. Therefore, shocks to securitization do not matter in the absence of frictions in equity markets.
Furthermore, the decoupling of the lending and borrowing sides may eliminate the scope for certain types of fiscal intervention. For instance, a fiscal transfer to banks simply induces them to pay more dividends, without altering their lending or other activities. 3 This is a reflection of the Modigliani-Miller 2 There are two reasons for this choice. First, we believe that such shocks do not always -or even often-threaten the financial system with collapse. So their study in non-crisis situations may be of independent interest. And second, accounting for the recent financial crisis would probably require the introduction of informational asymmetries, a feature that would considerably restrict the set of questions that our model could address. 3 So, this version of our model is consistent with the views of several economists, e.g., theorem, and is likely to be present in any model that (implicitly or explicitly) assumes a frictionless market for bank equity.
We specify the friction in the form of dividend smoothing. 4 In this model, banks may engage in costly securitization because the alternative may be a costly adjustment of dividend payments (or costs of raising new capital). When securitization costs increase or when a liquidity shock increases the demand for excess reserves, the spread between the lending rate and the risk-free (CCAPM) rate increases, and the volume of loans falls. There is a role for fiscal policy in this case. A fiscal cash infusion reduces the spread and increases the volume of loans. Optimally conducted fiscal policy can completely liberate monetary policy from pursuing conflicting objectives, allowing the achievement of greater
efficiency.
An important normative result in the extant literature is Cúrdia and Woodford's (2009a,c) finding that the presence of financial frictions and shocks does not fundamentally alter the strong policy implication of simpler NK models prescribing a flexible inflation target. Although our model is different, our conclusion about the normative case for pursuing price stability is similar. Optimal policy tolerates some (but not much) inflation variability. In response to liquidity shocks (increases in the demand for reserves or costs of securitization) it moves the policy rate very little and may allow instead a sharp increase in money growth. This finding is reminiscent of Poole's (1970) results in the context of the IS-LM model. 5 As in Poole, a policy that would restrict money growth variability would carry a large welfare cost in our model. Also, echoing similar findings in the literature we find that a simple rule reacting to inflation gets close to optimal (Ramsey) policy in terms of welfare.
In what follows, Section 2 presents our model. Section 3 presents the param- Mulligan (2008) , who argued against the US bank-bailout plan informally, asserting that it was simply a transfer from taxpayers to the owners of banks. 4 In the corporate finance literature, the observation that managers smooth dividends goes back to Lintner (1956) . Our simple way of incorporating this motive is admittedly ad hoc, but follows the existing literature [see, for example, Jermann and Quadrini (2006) and their references]. 5 Poole pointed out that in face of shocks to the LM curve, monetary policy should keep the interest rate constant and allow the money supply to fluctuate endogenously.
eter values used for our simulations reported in Section 4. Section 5 presents results on optimal (Ramsey) policies. Section 6 contains a discussion of possible extensions and Section 7 summarizes and concludes.
Model
We consider an economy populated with infinitely-lived households, monopolistically competitive banks and firms producing differentiated intermediate goods,
perfectly competitive firms producing the final good, and fiscal and monetary authorities. Our rendition of households and their demand for money is closely related to the standard Lucas and Stokey (1983) setup with cash goods and credit goods, often used in the normative literature [e.g., Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991); Correia, Nicolini, and Teles (2008)]. To incorporate a demand for deposits in the model, we assume that the consumption good is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate over a good that can be bought with cash and a good that can be bought using deposits. We let "leisure" implicitly serve as the credit good in our model. Each period is divided into two subperiods: a financial exchange followed by a goods exchange. In the financial exchange, after the realization of current shocks, retailers borrow from banks to buy the intermediate goods and assemble the final good to be sold to consumers, the government, and banks (in the version of the model with costly banking); households pay taxes and choose their asset portfolios, acquiring the money and deposits that they plan to use in the subsequent goods exchange; and firms producing intermediate goods pay wages and dividends with the proceeds of their sales to retailers. In the goods exchange, households use money and deposits to buy goods from the retailers that have not been hit by a default shock (those who have been hit by the shock end up not producing anything). We assume that the government buys goods with cash (although this is inconsequential for our analysis). Retailers must wait until the following financial exchange to use the cash and liquidate the deposits that they acquire; so, they are indifferent between these means of payment and 5 set the same price for cash and deposit goods.
Households
The representative household gets utility from consumption and disutility from work:
with 0 < β < 1, 0 < Φ < 1 and χ > 0, where c The household's budget constraint, in real terms, is:
where Π t ≡ A t is the gross nominal CCAPM interest rate. Risk-free nominal bonds may be issued by the government or other households (although, in equilibrium, the latter will be in zero net supply). Moreover, we will treat securitization of loans by banks as issuing risk-free bonds (so, the bank incurs the default cost of securitized loans). This is just to simplify our notation; we could equivalently assume that households directly incur the default costs of securitized loans and, in equilibrium, banks would pay a higher interest rate to households who bear the default cost.
The households' optimization problem is
M ax
at,c Msubject to the cash-and deposits-in-advance constraints
and the budget constraint (1). The first-order conditions of this optimization problem are:
where λ t is the Langrange multiplier associated with the household's budget constraint.
Intermediate goods producers
There is a unit mass of monopolistically competitive firms producing intermediate goods. Firm j operates the production function:
We assume that firms set their prices facing a Calvo-type price rigidity (with no indexation).
Final goods producers
Producers of the final good-henceforth, "retailers"-are perfectly competitive.
They use x t (j) units of each intermediate good j ∈ [0, 1] to produce y t units of the final good with
where ε > 1. Firms hit by a default shock use their inputs but don't produce any output.
Intermediate good j sells for the nominal price P X t (j). We break the retailer's optimization problem into two parts. First, the cost minimization problem involves choosing x t (j) for all j ∈ [0, 1] to minimize
given y t and subject to the constraint imposed by the production function (3).
This implies
where
is the marginal (and average) cost of producing y t .
Second, we assume that retailers must borrow from banks to buy intermediate goods:
where P t is the price of the final good. The zero-profit condition of retailers implies
So, P t is just a markup over the cost P X t of acquiring the goods, and the markup factor is the interest rate on loans. The zero profit condition of retailers has the following interpretation. A one-period entrant at time t could borrow L t , buy intermediate goods and sell them for P t y t . Next period, the potential entrant would have exactly P t y t = 1 + R L t L t to pay off the bank loan with no profit or loss.
Banks
Banks are owned by households and have some market power in setting the interest rates on deposits and loans.
7 A bank setting the gross nominal interest rate, 1 + R L t , that it charges on its loans, l t , faces the demand curve for loans
with σ l > 1. Similarly, a bank setting the gross nominal interest rate, 1 + R D t , paid on its deposits, d t , faces
with σ d > 1. The variables with an upper bar (d t , l t , R 
The representative bank chooses z t , a t , m (8) , (9), (10) , and the cash-flow constraint
with Φ a ≥ 0 and Φ z ≥ 0, where δ t is the default rate, and τ t a tax (when positive) or transfer (when negative) financed by taxing households. To study the responses of endogenous variables to a fiscal transfer to banks, we set
When Φ a > 0, banks face a cost of issuing an amount of securities a t different from
where a ss > 0 is the steady-state value of a t and z s t is a shock to securitization.
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When Φ z > 0, banks face a cost of setting dividends different from z
where z ss is the steady-state value of z t .
In a symmetric equilibrium, the first-order conditions of this maximization problem are:
but this does not matter for our results. Since Ricardian Equivalence holds in our model, we don't need to model the dynamics of public debt explicitly. 9 We can just assume that the fiscal authority maintains a balanced budget and sets
When we consider the model under a simple monetary policy rule, we will use a rule like
, or the equivalent rule reacting to CPI inflation. We will compare these rules to optimal (Ramsey) policy.
Market clearing conditions
The goods market clearing condition is
and the money market clearing condition is
Shock processes
We assume that ε m t and ε τ t are white noises (with standard deviations σ m and σ τ ) and that the other shocks follow autoregressive processes of order one: 
Frictionless Equity Market
The special case of our model with a frictionless equity market (Φ z = 0) has a number of strong implications. In this case, (13) implies λ t = λ z t . Then, combining (14) with (2), we see that the marginal cost of securitization is zero.
If we set a ss = 0 (so that any securitization is costly), banks will not issue any securities. Note that this implication is not due to the functional forms we assume for costs. The more general point is that banks should not undertake costly securitization if they can issue equity (freely adjust dividends), get funds at the CCAPM rate from their owners, and save the costs of securitization.
Also, in this case, (15) implies that the spread between the lending rate and the risk-free (CCAPM) rate fluctuates only in response to default shocks, and does not depend on the other shocks in our model. Moreover, in this case, the lump-sum tax or transfer τ t has no effect, except on the banks' dividend payments z t . All these implications of the model are removed once we allow for a friction in the equity market (Φ z > 0).
Parametrization
Our model has a number of parameters that are hard to calibrate. These parameter values do not play an important role for our results because our presentation will highlight either qualitative features of optimal policies or broad quantitative differences across policies, and these are not sensitive to the parameter values. to inflation to 1.5. Finally, we set the steady-state gross inflation rate per quarter to its optimal value, equal to 0.9996. We explain later how this value is obtained and comment upon it.
The standard deviations of our shocks to productivity and government purchases take standard values. Our shocks to the central bank's interest rate rule and our tax shock (fiscal transfer to the banking sector) are only for illustrative purposes and their size does not matter for our analysis. 12 For each shock following an AR(1) process, we set the inertia parameter equal to 0.9.
We set the standard deviation of our default shock innovation such that an increase (in the charge-off rate) of the magnitude observed during the recent 11 Larger values of Φz and Φa would make banks less willing to adjust dividend payments and securitization; this would make the effects of financial shocks larger under all the policies we consider below, but it would not affect the qualitative features or comparisons across policies that we will highlight. 12 We use the estimate of the monetary policy shock in Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2007) and assume the tax shock has a standard deviation of one percent. But we deactivate both shocks throughout, except for using the responses to these shocks to highlight their transmission mechanisms.
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financial crisis would occur on average once in 80 years in our model. In the data, the average charge-off rate from 1985Q1 to 2008Q3 was 0.86 percent; the rate grew to 2.88 percent in 2009Q3. Under our parametrization, an increase of this magnitude over 4 quarters has probability 1 320 , given our AR(1) process and assuming that the innovation has a Gaussian distribution. 13 So, a randomly selected quarter may be the start of a large 4-quarter increase in the default rate on average every 320 quarters or 80 years, which roughly corresponds to the time elapsed between the Great Depression and the recent crisis.
Similarly, we set the standard deviation of the reserves-demand shock innovation such that, starting from its steady-state value of 7.6 percent (the August 2008 figure), the reserves-to-deposits ratio reaches at least 107 percent (the August 2009 figure) in one year's time with probability 1 320 . Finally, we set the standard deviation of the securitization shock innovation such that, starting from the steady state, a one-standard-deviation innovation reduces the zero-cost amount of securities by the same amount as a onestandard-deviation reserves-demand shock innovation increases reserves (for a constant amount of deposits). This choice will allow us to compare the effects of the two shocks under optimal policy because the two shocks have the same impact effect in terms of tightening the banks' balance sheets.
The parameter values are as follows: 13 More precisely, the standard deviation σ δ of the default shock innovation is set such that a variable having a Gaussian probability distribution with mean zero and variance σ 2 δ 1 + ρ 2 δ + ρ 4 δ + ρ 6 δ exceeds ln (2.88)−ln (0.86) with probability 1 320 , where ρ δ = 0.9 denotes the inertia in the default shock. To provide some intuition for the potential role of fiscal policy in our norma- 14 Some of the small responses in our IRFs also reflect general-equilibrium interactions that we don't highlight in the text. For example, after an increase in demand for reserves, the interest rate on deposits rises (because banks try to tap the deposit market more as their balance sheets tighten) and consumers switch from buying cash goods to buying deposit goods. This reduces household demand for money.
tive analysis (later in the paper), Figure 7 shows the effects of a fiscal transfer to banks, reducing τ in (12) from its steady-state value of 0 to -0.01. This transfer increases the bank's cash flow and makes them more willing to lend. So, they cut the interest rate on loans which reduces consumer prices upon impact and stimulates spending.
The removal of the equity market frictions does not change the impulseresponse functions except for shocks to the demand for reserves (Figure 9 ).
First of all, compared to Figure 6 , the contractionary effects of this liquidity shock on output, consumption and hours are an order of magnitude smaller. In Figure 6 (with the equity-market friction) the contraction reflected the increase in bank lending rates in response to tighter balance sheet conditions. In Figure   9 (without the equity-market friction), balance sheet conditions don't play a role, and lending rates actually fall (by a small amount). 15 In this case, the increase in money demand has the familiar (but small) deflationary effect. simple rule responding to CPI inflation) do. We will return to this point after discussing the IRFs for optimal policy in the following section.
Normative Results
The simple NK model has a sharp (and well known) policy implication identify- would call for price stability-keeping the inflation rate equal to zero-if there were no monetary distortion (as in standard NK models). Our model has price rigidity as well as distortions from a non-zero interest rate, and optimal policy has to strike a balance between these.
We solve for the optimal (Ramsey) policy using Dynare and the program Comparing the IRFs in Figure 3 , for a shock to government purchases, the simple rules again seem fairly close to optimal policy; but optimal policy keeps Π X closer to zero.
Optimal (Ramsey) Monetary Policy
The responses to a default shock, in Figure 4 , show how a simple rule reacting to CPI inflation (Π) may be undesirable. Optimal policy raises output and hours per producing firm (y and h)-albeit by small amounts-while the simple rule allows these variables to fall upon impact. Although aggregate output and hours (which have the same pattern of responses as the one we show for consumption) still fall, optimal policy opts for a smaller contraction, than the simple CPI rule does, in response to a default shock. Optimal policy essentially keeps its interest rate unchanged in response to a default shock, while the simple CPI rule raises the rate to fight the inflationary effect of this adverse supply shock-and this inappropriate monetary response leads to the contractions of output and hours.
The simple rule reacting to Π X does not share this problem and its IRFs are very close to those under optimal policy.
Our finding that optimal policy does not cut the policy rate in response to a default shock may seem counter-intuitive at first. This optimal response, however, highlights the fact that a default shock by itself (i.e., setting aside any chain reactions or financial frictions that it may trigger) shares the basic features of an adverse productivity shock or a positive shock to "wasteful" government expenditures. In a social planner's solution, the optimal response to any one of these adverse shocks would involve reducing consumption and increasing the labor input. In the Ramsey equilibrium, the policy rate must adjust to bring about the optimal contraction of consumption and increase in work effort, but subject to the constraints imposed by equilibrium conditions.
More specifically, comparing Figures 3 and 4 , we see some similar patterns in optimal responses to an increase in government purchases and an increase in the default rate. The optimal response to either shock entails working more and consuming less. The adverse wealth effect does most of the work for reducing consumption and increasing hours, but optimal monetary policy reinforces it by raising rates slightly. The main differences between optimal responses to an increase in government purchases and an increase in the default are in how these shocks affect lending rates and the volume of lending. The first-order conditions of banks require the lending rate to rise sharply, making the volume of loans fall, in response to a default shock.
Following a shock that hampers securitization, optimal policy ( Figure 5) allows output, consumption, labor hours, and lending to fall. To bring about the decrease in the volume of loans as an equilibrium outcome, lending rates must rise; and this increases CPI inflation. The inflation, in turn, is accompanied by an expansion of the monetary base, which prevents a sharp drop in real money balances. The simple CPI rule in Figure 5 leads to qualitatively similar responses. Optimal policy, however, entails a very small (12 basis points per annum) increase in the policy rate (immediately followed by a small interest-rate cut), while the simple CPI rule raises the policy rate substantially to fight CPI inflation. Consequently, the contractions in output, consumption, and hours are smaller under optimal policy than they are under the simple rule. Again, the problem with the CPI rule is that it reacts to the effect of higher lending rates on inflation, and the simple rule reacting to Π X does not share this problem.
A positive shock to demand for reserves (in Figure 6 ) has essentially the same qualitative effects as a securitization shock (in Figure 5 ). The only qualitative differences are in the responses of inflation in the price of intermediate goods and the policy rate-optimal policy cuts the rate when the liquidity shock arises from stronger demand for reserves. The magnitudes of these responses, however, are very small for both shocks.
In quantitative terms, the optimal contractions in output, consumption, and hours are about half as large in Figure 6 (when a liquidity shock arises from an increase in demand for reserves), compared to Figure 5 (when the shock originates from securitization problems). 18 As we explained in Section 3, we have set the standard deviations of these two shocks such that they have the same impact effect in terms of tightening the banks' balance sheets (i.e., making banks choose between cutting loans and cutting dividends). So why does optimal policy have to tolerate a larger contraction when the shock originates from securitization problems?
The answer, we suspect, has to do with the fact that a problem in securities markets is a real problem; monetary policy does not have a direct policy instrument to address it in our model (although, in reality the FED has been very innovative in devising new and unconventional policy instruments in re-sponse to problems in securities markets). The securitization shock tightens bank balance sheets, but printing money is not an effective way to deal with a liquidity shock that does not directly increase money demand. Nominal money growth only increases by 0.1 percent in Figure 5 . By contrast, when the gist of a liquidity shock is that banks want more money, monetary policy has a direct instrument. Nominal money growth increases to over 3 percent per quarter-30 times the optimal response to the securitization shock-when a liquidity crunch arises from stronger demand for reserves. Optimal policy in our model is quite generous in accommodating the demand for bank reserves, and does not cut the policy rate much.
In Figure 6 , compared to optimal policy, our simple rule responding to CPI inflation tolerates much larger contractions in output, consumption, and hours, when the demand for reserves increases. The difference arises from the fact that the simple rule raises the policy rate to fight inflation, while optimal policy cuts the policy rate to moderate the contraction. Once again, the simple rule reacting to Π X comes closer to optimal policy.
Optimal responses to an increase in demand for reserves in the frictionless model ( Figure 9 ) are quite different from optimal responses when there is an equity-market friction ( Figure 6 ). 19 With no friction, optimal policy can actually make banks cut their lending rate and lend more. This leads to (small) expansions of output, consumption and hours. Absent the friction in the market for bank equity, an increase in demand for reserves does not pose a serious problem for monetary policy because the lending and funding sides of banks are essentially decoupled.
Welfare Losses
Our welfare criterion is the utility function of the representative household. We compute the conditional expectation of the household's value function starting in the deterministic steady state and express welfare differences as consumption equivalents following Lucas (2003 The mechanical details of how we calculate conditional welfare and express differences in consumption units are as described in Canzoneri, Cumby, and
We calculate the welfare losses from simple rules relative to optimal policy.
In general, the computed welfare losses are quite small. For instance, the rule involving a response to inflation in the price index for intermediate goods only entails a welfare loss of 0.03 percent compared to optimal policy. 21 That is, augmenting consumption by 0.03 percent each period would be enough to compensate consumers for living under the simple rule, instead of having the fully optimal policy in effect. In this sense, the normative punch line of simple NK models applies to our model: a simple rule that stabilizes the "right" measure of inflation is optimal, or very close to optimal.
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Do these welfare results imply that the conduct of monetary policy doesn't matter much in our model (as it is often the case in the NK model)? One way to answer this question is to consider the performance of alternative monetary policy procedures that have been or are being used in the real world. For instance, consider a rule that sets an almost constant growth rate for the money supply. 23 The welfare cost of this policy is 1.26 percent in our model. This is not 20 The results are much the same if we use the unconditional expectation instead. 21 Somewhat larger but also quite small is the welfare loss associated with a rule involving a response to CPI inflation. 22 To be clear, we think one could introduce shocks (like a shock to monopoly markups) that are likely to create policy tradeoffs and break the policy prescription of targeting the appropriate inflation rate in our model (because we know how to create policy tradeoffs in NK models without banks). The point is that the shocks and frictions we have introduced do not break this normative prescription of NK models.
surprising: as we saw above, optimal policy allows money growth to fluctuate considerably in response to shocks to the demand for reserves in our model. As a second example consider an interest-rate rule that responds to the deviation of output from its steady-state value: policy turns expansionary (contractionary) when output is below (above) trend-or the steady-state value in our model abstracting from growth. We consider a simple rule with the same values for the inertia parameter (0.8) and the response to CPI inflation (1.5) plus a response to the "output gap" with a coefficient of 0.5 (and we define the gap as the percentage deviation of output from its steady-state value). 
Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy
Is there scope for fiscal intervention in response to financial shocks? If so, how would the presence of optimal fiscal policy change the optimal monetary responses to shocks? Answering these questions, of course, would require modelling both the benefits of fiscal intervention and the costs arising from tax distortions. We think our model is a useful framework for organizing our thoughts about the benefits of fiscal intervention: if the gist of the problem is that financial shocks tighten the balance-sheet condition of banks, a fiscal transfer can serve to loosen the constraint. A convincing treatment of the costs of fiscal intervention, however, would take us too far afield-and we don't pursue it in this paper. 25 So, our discussion below only highlights the scope for fiscal intervention when a perfect policy instrument-a transfer financed by a non-distortionary tax on households-is available.
Once we compute jointly optimal fiscal and monetary policies, the policy response to a securitization shock is purely fiscal, and this fiscal response exactly offsets the effects of the shock. This finding is intuitive in the context of our stylized model with a lump-sum tax: a fiscal transfer from households to banks can save households the resource cost of the securitization shock. Since fiscal policy perfectly neutralizes the effects of the shock, there is no reason for monetary policy to respond.
Optimal fiscal policy also makes a transfer to banks when the demand for reserves increases. This shock, however, calls for a monetary response as well. In policy has to tolerate a decrease in output when there is a friction in the equity market. These findings are also intuitive. The fiscal instrument is essentially used to offset the friction in the equity market, and optimal monetary policy opts for essentially the same solution that it would choose in the absence of this friction.
As we noted earlier, optimal responses to a default shock are much the same with or without the friction in the market for bank equity. This is because this friction only matters for whether or not shocks to the funding side are transmitted to the lending side, while a default shock directly affects the lending side of banks. For this shock, the IRFs under optimal fiscal and monetary policy (not displayed) virtually coincide with the IRFs under optimal monetary policy (in Figures 4 and 8) .
Interestingly, the Fed assumed a less conventional and more fiscal role during the recent financial crisis. Our model is suggestive about the scope for unconventional monetary policy but fails to capture any costs. As it stands, our model would imply that the central bank should take over financial intermediation altogether and save the costs of all the distortions that arise from our imperfect banking sector! Absent a convincing way to model and quantify the costs of unconventional monetary policy, it seems difficult to assess the scope for these interventions.
Extensions
In assumptions that serve the same purpose as our ad-hoc rendition. 26 Since the presence or absence of a friction in the market for bank equity has important implications, a better structural understanding of it seems essential for assessing its potential importance in reality. This is particularly important in the context of jointly optimal monetary-fiscal policy. Under our specification, the optimal policy response to a securitization shock is purely fiscal; monetary policy does not respond, but fiscal policy uses transfers (tax cuts) to reverse the tightening of bank balance sheets. In response to an increase in the demand for reserves, the fiscal instrument is essentially used to offset the friction in the equity market, and optimal monetary policy opts for essentially the same solution that it would choose in the absence of this friction. It remains to be seen whether and to what extent optimal fiscal policy would still aim at (and accomplish efficiently) bank recapitalization if features such as adverse selection, moral hazard, and tax distortions were present.
To our knowledge, the corporate finance literature notes the prevalence of dividend smoothing but does not go beyond our ad hoc rendition. We are not aware of any model of the agency problem between managers and share holders that leads to dividend smoothing. 27 In the context of banks, however, we think a better structural understanding of funding frictions, and the role of securitization, may involve modelling capital-adequacy constraints. In reality, banks have a low marginal cost for the funds they raise in deposit and interbank markets.
Equity finance is more costly, and a binding capital-adequacy constraint may well pin down the composition of bank liabilities and net worth. Pinning down this composition-i.e., breaking the Modigliani-Miller theorem-is essentially what the ad hoc dividend-smoothing motive accomplishes in our model. We think incorporating a capital-adequacy constraint and taking note of how it is affected by securitization is a promising direction for future work.
Our model presumes smoothly functioning-albeit less than perfect-financial markets. As such, our focus is on optimal policy during normal times; we don't address some important concerns (like contagion in default risk or the collapse of markets under asymmetric information) that policymakers may have had during the recent crisis. We also assume that default is exogenous and that it can be predicted before the loans are made (as in Cúrdia and Woodford (2009a, c) ).
Since there are no default decisions or information asymmetries in our model, there is no credit rationing. For the same reasons, banks do not need to impose a collateral constraint on borrowers. But in spite of all these limitations we still feel that understanding optimal policy in our model setting is a useful exercise in its own right, and could also serve as a starting point in organizing our thoughts about the recent financial crisis.
One question that has received attention in the literature is whether or not 27 Our presumption is that simple models with symmetric information cannot capture the relevant agency problem between managers and shareholders. In reality, managers may be better informed, than shareholders are, about the quality of assets and may use dividend policy as a way to signal financial strength, or hide weakness.
adverse financial shocks put the central bank at risk of hitting the zero-bound on nominal interest rates. The answer, within the confines of our model, is "not under optimal policy or simple inflation targeting rules." As we have already noted, positive default shocks are akin to adverse supply shocks in our model; they generate (small) interest rate hikes under optimal policy (and larger hikes under CPI targeting). And in response to an increase in the demand for liquidity, optimal policy essentially keeps its interest rate constant-allowing the money supply to expand endogenously. Since neither optimal policy nor our simple rules call for a significant decrease in the policy rate, adverse financial shocks (by themselves) do not create a risk of hitting the zero bound.
By contrast, in Cúrdia and Woodford's model, a shock that works like our default shock does lead to a decrease in the policy rate under optimal policy and may be deflationary under some simple rules (but not under optimal policy).
We suspect that these differences may arise from the fact that in Cúrdia and Woodford's model borrowers are households, and a default shock that increases bank lending rates curbs aggregate demand. In our model, borrowers are firms; financial shocks that increase bank lending rates affect the supply side. Adverse financial shocks are effectively adverse supply shocks and lead to a contraction of output as well as a rise in inflation.
During the recent financial crisis, however, banks mostly responded to adverse financial shocks by reducing the volume of loans and inflationary pressures were not an immediate concern (nor were any strong deflationary pressures apparent). An extension of our model to a setting with asymmetric information and credit rationing may be of interest. In such a setting, the volume of credit may replace our bank lending rates as an indicator of financial stress, and inflation may play a less important role as a barometer of macroeconomic conditions.
Conclusions
In this paper we have added banks and also included frictions in the market for 
